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Abstract
In recent years, public agencies have frequently deployed behaviour-
al insights to generate benefits for society, through encouraging citi-
zens to comply with official requests, and more generally encourag-
ing them to cooperate with public agencies to help deliver outcomes 
of collective benefit. In parallel, there has been a large increase in the 
amount and quality of the research evidence available on behavioural 
public policy. This review takes two contrasting areas where behav-
ioural insights have been used: tax collection where government pol-
icy is compulsory (i.e. requiring compliance), and energy use where 
social objectives are non-compulsory, and achieved more by persua-
sion and encouragement. Processes of modifying and changing be-
haviour require different approaches whether the change is deemed 
necessary by the state or not. In taxes, the sole use of enforcement 
is rarely efficacious, whereas increasing the uncertainty of follow-up 
and audit increases compliance. Offering discounts for energy bills 
appears to be an effective method for achieving cooperation. How-
ever, the use of social norms and increased information and profes-
sional advice is effective for both compulsory and non-compulsory 
areas of compliance and cooperation. This has important implica-
tions for policymakers, who may be seeking effective methods of 
encouraging behaviour change. While there are differences in ap-
proaches for compulsory and non-compulsory areas of policy, there 
may be areas that move from non-statutory to statutory in the future. 
In this case, the development of desired social norms appears to be 
the most effective method of ensuring overall compliance.
Public organisations need to raise revenue, issue 
fines and collect debts from citizens, activities that 
are essential if governments are to function effective-
ly. Many governments in the developed world have 
powers to carry out these functions, but others also 
rely on citizens complying voluntarily, taking advan-
tage of embedded civic values and those promoted 
within modern society. In any case, voluntary pay-
ment is much more cost effective than chasing peo-
ple through the courts. Behavioural insights have a 
major role to play in this niche. In recent years, there 
has been an increased interest in behavioural science 
and approaches to interventions across a wide range 
of policymaking, such as exploring public economic 
and environmental consumption (Swim et al. 2011). 
Rooted in the process of understanding human de-
cision-making – initially in the context of economics 
– behavioural science evolved to take into account 
a range of aspects of decision-making (e.g. Fishbein 
and Ajzen, 1975). Since the mid-2000s, governments’ 
interest in behavioural science has increased dramat-
ically, built on a growing body of academic work and 
popular books such as Thaler and Sunstein’s Nudge 
(2008).
In 2010, the UK government set up the Behaviour-
al Insights Team (BIT) to introduce behavioural inter-
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ventions to improve the formation and delivery of pub-
lic policies. One of the key areas of interest has been 
the use of behavioural insights to redesign letters and 
communications between citizens and governments 
(e.g. reminders to pay taxes or text messages to re-
mind people to settle court fines). Randomised con-
trolled trials (RCTs) were conducted to evaluate their 
effectiveness, and show that these interventions have 
delivered strong results (see Cabinet Office 2012). 
This approach has been emulated by the UK’s HM 
Revenue and Customs and the Strategic Initiatives 
Branch of the Department for Premier and Cabinet in 
New South Wales. Other behavioural units have also 
been set up across the world.
In spite of these advances, knowledge about 
the effectiveness of behavioural interventions is still 
sparse. While there is literature on citizen compliance 
and cooperation, evidence is scattered across vari-
ous subfields, such as criminology, transport stud-
ies, energy, or political science – just to name a few. 
Many RCTs have already been conducted but are not 
widely known, except by subject specialists, meaning 
policy-makers do not have access to the full range of 
academic knowledge when designing new forms of 
public compliance.
The basis for this evidence review is therefore 
twofold:
1. To draw together key literature in discipline 
sub-fields on the topic of behavourial compliance.
2. To get a better understanding of the conditions 
determining the success and failure of behavioural 
interventions.
To ensure the review was not too broad, the initial 
focus was on public and individual behaviour change 
– that is, citizen behaviour change with societal bene-
fit. Thus in reviewing the literature it was important to 
find papers that firstly discussed specific public inter-
ventions, and secondly assessed their effectiveness. 
We excluded most ‘grey’ studies because of insuffi-
cient detail about study design.
After completing a preliminary review, it became 
apparent that there is a distinction between policy ar-
eas where the public is required to behave in a cer-
tain way, and those areas where compulsion is not 
present and cooperation is sought through an appeal 
to the public good or private benefit. For instance, al-
though it is the law to pay tax in full and on time, it 
is not the law for the public to reduce their energy 
consumption by a recommended amount. Although 
at first glance this may seem a minor distinction, 
when it comes to effective interventions for behaviour 
change, it encourages a shift in approach.
Therefore, in addition to discussing interventions, 
current practices and the main conditions that deter-
mine the success or failure of behaviour change strat-
egies, this review has since developed to address 
the sociology and psychology of behaviour change 
in compulsory and non-compulsory contexts. The 
focus of the review is on a policy area where behav-
iour is to some degree compulsory (i.e. the payment 
of taxes and associated fees and fines if taxes are 
unpaid), and one where behavior is non-compulso-
ry (i.e. public homeowners’ energy consumption). It is 
possible of course to examine other compulsory are-
as, such as licenses, or non-compulsory ones, such 
as transport use, so this choice must be regarded as 
generating evidence from two case studies.
Search Strategy
Relevant articles were retrieved through search en-
gines (e.g. Google Scholar, UCL Metalib) and bibliog-
raphies/reference lists in journal articles and books 
using keywords such as ‘tax evasion/compliance’ 
or ‘energy saving’ or similar wording. One hundred 
and thirty-four papers were found that met the initial 
search criteria. Subsequently, articles were subject-
ed to the selection criteria for inclusion in the review, 
leaving 122. Initially, texts were selected based on 
whether titles included keywords or similar wording 
relevant to the particular theme. Abstracts required 
mention of a quantitative or qualitative study on in-
centive scheme evaluation. In addition, texts were 
specifically required to refer to public interventions, 
and any papers that discussed businesses or work-
places were automatically excluded.
Out of 122 papers reviewed, a final list of 47 are 
discussed directly in this evidence review; 27 explore 
the payment of taxes, and 20 explore household en-
ergy consumption.[1] These 47 papers were selected 
as they cover the majority of results, conclusions and 
methodologies found across the broader review, and 
are useful to highlight some of the most interesting 
points of comparison.
Structure of the Review
We begin by describing the methodological ap-
proaches that define the field of evaluating behav-
ioural interventions in tax and energy. This sets up a 
discussion of the implications that the different com-
pulsory versus non-compulsory areas have on meth-
odological choices and research questions. Next, 
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approaches are broken down by sub-theme, and in-
terventions from both energy and tax fields and their 
efficacy are discussed. Finally, the conclusions bring 
together some of the major discussions across all of 
the areas, and frame these within the context of pol-
icy-making.
Within each section, there is a list of the key find-
ings, which will enable policy-makers to see the most 
and least effective approaches for each area in that 
intervention at a glance. The Appendix provides a 
more detailed breakdown of each study forming the 
basis of this review.
Methodologies in evaluating behav-
ioural interventions
The majority of studies in tax compliance used ran-
domised controlled trials (RCTs) which, with good 
design and sample sizes, can provide unbiased re-
sults. RCTs can randomise participants into treatment 
(nudge) and control groups and then compare the 
results in relation to revenue obtained. This provides 
an estimate of the savings from changing procedures 
from tax compliance. The advantages of RCTs are 
balanced by some limitations. It can be hard to gen-
eralize from RCTs to other contexts and time periods 
(though this problem limits other methods too). It is 
also hard to dig down into why the nudge works, as 
the research usually only generates the headline re-
sult, though sub-group analysis can overcome this 
problem.
For this reason, this review deliberately includes 
studies which have used other valid methods, such 
as agent-based modeling, which is common in gen-
eral tax literature, looking at specific experiments on 
the effectiveness of different incentive schemes (e.g. 
Hashimzadea et al. 2014); also see (Garrido and Mit-
tone 2013). Agent-based modeling can examine a 
range of influences on the outcome rather than the 
just the treatment effect, so the changes in tax collec-
tion can be modeled as a system. This method can 
pick up the long-term dynamic impact of a change 
in tax or fine collection procedures rather than just a 
one off intervention, which itself may trigger other ac-
tions and behaviours.
The overarching question that drives much of 
the taxes and fines research is ‘how can we ensure 
that individuals pay for public services or violation of 
those services?’ It is possible that here lies the dif-
ference between the approaches across taxes and 
subsequent fees and fines associated with non-com-
pliance: tax is entirely ‘above board’, carried out for 
the public good, but fines are for those that have al-
ready violated rules around public services, and need 
to be discovered and punished. It is potentially this 
distinction, that fines are in fact harder to enforce than 
taxes as they are already associated with individuals 
who have committed an act of non-compliance, that 
means carrying out RCTs and natural field exper-
iments on the effectiveness of fines becomes more 
difficult. For instance, many studies factor in explicitly 
the cost efficiency of detection of violators, and use 
this as a key determinant of the optimal fine (e.g. Po-
linsky and Shavell 2000).
As with tax, the majority of energy studies used 
RCTs, but many more in energy employed surveys of 
users. Several studies looked at the subjective impact 
of various incentives on energy use and energy cost 
savings, and compared this to the actual energy use 
changes. Interestingly, not only were many studies fo-
cused on getting households to use less energy or 
become more efficient in their energy use, but also 
on assessing the cost implications of various energy 
tariffs (e.g. Hydro One Networks 2006); Opinion Dy-
namics Corporation 2008). This indicates a shift in fo-
cus from evaluating compulsory interventions (in the 
primary interest of the state) to interventions that are 
non-compulsory and in the major interest of both the 
public and the state.
Some studies were conducted using variations on 
RCTs and natural field experiments, where it appears 
that various notification types (email, postal mail, 
text messages, personalized phone calls) have been 
found successful in increasing compliance in pay-
ment of fines (e.g. Haynes et al. 2013). These studies 
have all been carried out in specific instances where 
the public can be monitored with relative ease, such 
as registered individuals who have already committed 
a crime. In many instances, fines need to be given 
to individuals who are not registered with an author-
ity to which they commit the crime, i.e. fly tipping or 
environmental pollution in a local lake. Here, it is not 
possible to monitor a treatment group and a control 
group of individuals. This may be another reason for 
why there is little hard data on public responses to 
enforcement of fines. There is also little research ex-
ploring whether greater engagement with the pub-
lic increases compliance or cooperation excepting 
(Lamberton et al. 2014).
There are several other methods that are signifi-
cantly under-used in both compulsory and non-com-
pulsory settings. In addition, there is relatively little re-
search using qualitative or survey-based instruments 
to complement the widely used quantitative tech-
niques. The majority of tax literature focuses on the 
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use of mathematical models to understand the opti-
mal fine structures that would enhance compliance of 
individuals in paying their fines (e.g. Lewis 1988).
The main questions among fines researchers fo-
cused on firstly ‘how can we ensure that fines get 
paid?’, and secondly ‘how can fines increase future 
tax compliance?’ The reliance on quantitative meth-
odologies may reflect the less flexible research aims 
of compulsory areas such as taxes and fines. In con-
trast, with energy and non-compulsory areas there is 
room for a broader range of research questions that 
can include the more nuanced exploration of attitudes 
and values that qualitative research can provide.
The evaluation of behavioural inter-
ventions to increase compliance and 
cooperation in tax and energy
The next sections look at particular approaches to in-
creasing compliance and cooperation.
Social norms
Social normsim (Cialdini and Trost 1998) are behav-
ioural standards that affect people on the individual, 
community and national levels, where people can re-
act to knowledge about what others are doing. Social 
norms affect many areas of daily life. Within the tax 
compliance context, they can be defined as preva-
lence or acceptance of tax compliance or evasion, 
within a reference group such as people living a local 
area (Wenzel, 2005). Norms can be rightly or wrongly 
constructed by an individual (i.e. may actually reflect 
the views of those around them, or may not), and 
people will adhere to norms on specific issues. In the 
case of tax compliance, if an individual perceives that 
those around them or those that they personally re-
late to consistently evade taxes, that individual is also 
likely to evade taxation (see Hallsworth et al 2014). 
The literature review finds that changing and influenc-
ing perceived norms is an effective method for en-
hancing compliance and cooperation in individuals, 
especially when targeted within social groups.
Wenzel (2005) has shown, using two RCTs, that 
highlighting misperceptions about social norms to 
individuals is effective at increasing tax compliance 
in Australia. For instance, when an individual falsely 
perceives that their peers tend to evade, but is then 
informed otherwise, that individual will change their 
behaviour to be more in line with the new social ref-
erence of tax compliance. This effect was mirrored 
by two separate RCTs completed within ten years of 
each other on the Minnesota population (Coleman 
1996; 2007).
Both Kirchler et al. (2007) and the Behavioural In-
sights Team (BIT) (Cabinet Office 2012) have reviewed 
the evidence on the impact of emphasising positive 
social norms (i.e. highlighting good behaviour from 
reference groups) on tax compliance, and shown that 
it is also an effective way of increasing tax compli-
ance in individuals.
Andrei et al. (2013) used an agent-based simula-
tion model to describe the relationships between indi-
viduals in a social network, with the aim of increasing 
tax compliance across the network. They found that 
those networks with a high degree of centrality had 
the largest positive effects on information propaga-
tion: social circles with a ‘leader’, or central well-con-
nected figure (whether that be a socialite, respected 
individual or central figure such as a mayor) dissemi-
nate information more effectively within the group. By 
influencing several central figures within identified so-
cial networks, governments can help to disseminate 
information about positive social norms within the 
network, promoting increased honesty in tax report-
ing among individuals.
The research also highlights some conditions and 
exceptions to be aware of when appealing to social 
norms. Blumenthal et al. (2001) found no overall treat-
ment effect in their RCT carried out in Minnesota. 
They posted out two types of letter with varying nor-
mative appeals, and then followed those taxpayers’ 
reported income in the following tax year. Although 
there were no statistically significant treatment effects 
for the whole group, there were significant positive ef-
fects for some population sub-groups, including up-
per middle class taxpayers. However, the letters had 
a negative effect on tax compliance for those in the 
highest income bracket.
McGraw and Scholz (1991) conducted another 
RCT, this time asking participants to watch video-
tapes emphasising social norms and personal con-
sequences of tax compliance and non-compliance. 
They found there was a positive predicted outcome 
on tax attitudes, however these attitudes did not 
translate into a change in participants’ compliance.
Interestingly, social norms were one of the most 
highly researched areas in tax compliance, but were 
less prevalent in energy research. This may be due to 
the fact that energy saving is non-compulsory. Ap-
pealing to people’s sense of ‘social decency’ norms 
may be less effective, but more research could test 
this hypothesis. However, several energy feedback 
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studies discussed the effect of comparing home en-
ergy use to people’s neighbours, and generally found 
this to be effective (e.g. Schultz et al. 2008). This 
method of comparison is a form of social norm, but 
is more competitive than appealing to a sense of so-
cial decency. The use of norms on collective behavior 
has strong effects, such as Peterson et al.’s (2007) 
findings on energy consumption in dormitories. The 
use of feedback and/or norms on household bills is 
now a strong and repeated finding for energy (see 
Hayes and Cone 1977); (Winett et al 1982); (Midden 
et al 1983); (Katzev and Johnson, 1984); (Brandon 
and Lewis 1999); (Matsukawa 2004); (Hydro One Net-
works 2006); Goldstein 2007; (Green 2008); (Allcott 
2011); Alahmad et al 2012; (Allcott and Rogers 2012); 
(Costa and Kahn 2013)—see also meta-analysis by 
(Abrahamse and Steg 2013).
In a slight variation on the use of social norms, 
public shaming and stigmatisation has been explored 
in relation to tax compliance. This is not the case 
with energy, likely linked to the fact that energy is a 
non-compulsory area and it is harder to tap into so-
cial norms against which people can be stigmatised 
or shamed. Coricelli et al (2012), using a randomised 
trial in France, showed that if tax evasion is made 
public but the offender is not reintegrated to the 
group (i.e. consistently shamed without the chance to 
restore their reputation), they are more likely to con-
tinue to tax evade. However, if the offender is made 
public but successfully reintegrated, this has a posi-
tive effect on tax compliance. Murphy (2008) built on 
other research, such as Coricelli et al’s study, indicat-
ing that shaming can lead to greater evasion in the fu-
ture. Murphy’s study found that those taxpayers who 
had been penalised for aggressive tax avoidance in 
the past and subsequently stigmatised as a result 
were less likely to comply in the future. Moral suasion 
does not work as a strategy (Torgler 2004); (Fellner et 
al. 2013), but stressing fairness in the communication 
is effective (Wenzel 2006).
The potentially negative or neutral outcomes for 
some interventions that use social norms indicate that 
care must be taken when contacting certain groups 
using social norms as an incentive for compliance or 
cooperation. In addition, it indicates that although so-
cial norms can be used to improve attitudes towards 
compliance and cooperation, these may need to be 
accompanied by another incentive to actually induce 
compliance or cooperation in individuals. With longer-
term changes in attitudes, compliance and coopera-
tion may come about as a result, but more research 
is required to confirm this claim.
Key findings:
•	 Communicating positive social norms to indi-
viduals has a positive effect on tax compliance 
(e.g. Hallsworth et al 2014).
•	 Using reference groups that individuals relate 
to is effective at encouraging individuals to un-
dertake new compliant behaviours (e.g. Halls-
worth et al. 2014).
•	 Challenging and contradicting misperceived 
social norms has a positive effect on tax com-
pliance (e.g. Coleman 1996; 2007).
•	 Using central figures within social networks is 
a good way to help disseminate information on 
positive social norms and challenge perceived 
social norms (Andrei et al 2013).
•	 Stigmatisation of past offenders may decrease 
tax compliance (Murphy 2008).
•	 Public shaming without successive reintegra-
tion may decrease tax compliance (Coricelli et 
al 2012).
Professional advice and increased public 
information
Devos (2012) addressed the relatively small area of re-
search into the impact that tax professionals’ advice 
has on tax compliance, using a survey among Aus-
tralian taxpayers. Devos found that when an individu-
al had a tax agent there was an increase in tax com-
pliance, and that the need for the tax agent strongly 
correlated with the need for compliance behaviour on 
the taxpayer’s part.
Alm et al. (2010) found results in line with Devos 
(2012) in their randomised trial in the US, where pro-
fessional information readily available to taxpayers 
significantly affected the tendency of an individual to 
file a tax return, and also affected the likelihood that 
the individual would report earnings accurately. Wen-
zel and Taylor (2004) found that sending rental prop-
erty schedules to taxpayers for them to itemise their 
deductions reduced deductions compared to tax-
payers who were not sent the schedule.
However, the HMRC (2009) undertook research 
into taxpayer experiences with assisted claims, and 
found that although taxpayers responded positively 
to their assisted journey through the claim process, 
overall the assistance had a limited impact on their 
understanding of their responsibilities when complet-
ing the process. It may be that professional services 
act as an incentive, as many taxpayers tend to want 
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to comply, but do not have the right information on 
how to do so accurately. However, tax services aimed 
at helping guide taxpayers through the filing process 
may actually do little to change underlying beliefs and 
ensure future tax compliance.
Many energy studies also focused on the use of 
technology and real-time energy use feedback us-
ing monitors in the home (e.g. Gleerup et al., 2010). 
The majority of these studies happened between 
2005 and 2008, possibly signaling a trend in the 
use of new monitors in homes (e.g. Green 2008). It 
almost certainly indicated an overall trend in energy 
use research resulting from highly positive research 
outcomes that indicated the success of energy use 
feedback on reducing household energy use (e.g. 
Brandon and Lewis 1999).
Information can have a positive effect on reducing 
energy use in the form of workshops, though these 
may be expensive to scale up (Geller 1981). Cam-
paigns at military bases have been shown to work too 
(McMakin et al. 2002).
The provision of advice and information to the 
public to increase cooperation and compliance has 
been found to be largely effective across energy and 
tax fields. Offering professional advice and informa-
tion can make the initial process of submitting taxes 
easier, while offering an optional and non-forceful way 
of providing incentives to reduce energy use. Profes-
sional advice and workshops or other forms of per-
sonalised messaging or information provision forms 
the impression of a larger effort to increase compli-
ance and cooperation, which may explain why these 
approaches and those in the social norms theme ap-
pear to be largely successful.
Key findings:
•	 Providing easy access to professional services 
for taxpayers increases tax compliance (Devos 
2012).
•	 Communicating timely advice on energy con-
sumption produces long-term reductions in 
usage (e.g. Hydro One Networks 2006).
•	 Home monitors and other feedback mecha-
nisms provide significant reductions in home 
energy use (Matsukawa 2004).
•	 Personalising contact has a positive effect on 
compliance (Haynes et al 2013).
•	 Allowing taxpayers to indicate where they 
would like their tax to go, and communi-
cating government strategies, have positive 
impacts on tax compliance (Lamberton et 
2014).
•	 Messaging has a positive effect on increas-
ing compliance with payment of fines (Haynes 
et al 2013).
Punishment
As far back as the 1980s, there has been research 
into how effective punishment is for reducing tax eva-
sion (this strategy is almost impossible to apply to 
energy). At this time, there were several studies that 
reported negative correlations between perceived 
audit probability and tax evasion, but not enough 
to provide evidence for a causal relationship. Spicer 
and Thomas set up an RCT in the US in 1982 where 
groups were either told precise or imprecise proba-
bilities of audit. They then measured the compliance 
rates of the subjects. Their results lent support to 
previous assumptions that increasing uncertainty of 
audit increases compliance (see also Slemrod et al. 
2001). Much of the recent literature has focused on 
the use of punishment or threat of punishment (e.g. 
Iyer et al. 2010).
This result has since been backed up by sever-
al other studies: Kleven et al. (2011) found in a ran-
domised trial in Denmark that prior audits and threat 
of audits had a significant impact on self-reported in-
come, but no effect on third-party reported income, 
possibly because the blame is entirely on the individ-
ual with self-reported income.
Tan and Yim (2014) also experimented on a previ-
ous auditing rule (the ‘bounded rule’), where taxpay-
ers are informed of the maximum number of audits 
and it is then up to the taxpayers to decide on the 
probability of audit as a group. In their RCT, com-
pared with the flat rate rule where taxpayers are in-
formed of the constant probability of audit, they found 
that when uncertainty is high, compliance also tends 
to be high.
Hasseldine et al. (2007) conducted an RCT in the 
UK consisting of several treatment letters, including 
ones simply mentioning the possibility of audit, in-
creased audit, and taxpayers preselected for audit. 
For each letter, there was a 56.4%, 53.8% and 53.7% 
increase in reported turnover respectively, lending 
further support to the idea that increased audit un-
certainty increases tax compliance.
However, in slight contrast to the research above, 
Bergman and Nevarez’s (2006) controlled trial on Ar-
gentinian and Chilean taxpayers found the counterin-
tuitive result that on average audits did not increase 
future compliance. In fact, the gap between pre-au-
dit and post-audit compliance rates actually wid-
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ened – those who had been audited tended to evade 
more after the audit, most likely because they felt the 
chance of them being audited again in the near future 
was low. Murphy (2008) found that increased punish-
ment can lead to greater evasion in the future. Her 
study found that those taxpayers who had been pe-
nalised for aggressive tax avoidance in the past, and 
subsequently stigmatised as a result, were less likely 
to comply in the future.
Pickhardt and Prinz (2014), in a summary of the 
main disciplines and approaches used in understand-
ing tax compliance, argued that one of the most im-
portant lessons to be learnt from recent research was 
that employing instruments to deter evasion, such 
as audits, and other forms of punishment, is likely to 
decrease compliance. In their review, they discussed 
how compliance is likely to erode if governments treat 
all public as potential evaders, and with increased 
evasion it becomes harder to enforce or encourage 
compliance. To conclude, they indicated that simpli-
fied tax codes and more professional advice available 
coupled with some punishment would be an effective 
approach to compliance.
The theme of punishment was significantly less 
prevalent in the energy literature, most likely because 
energy reduction is non-compulsory, and punishment 
would not be credible (see Pickhardt and Prinz 2014).
Key findings:
•	 Increasing uncertainty of audit increases tax 
compliance (Kleven et al 2011).
•	 Increased punishment can lead to decreased 
tax compliance (Murphy 2008).
Rewards
Burger and Caldwell (2011) used an RCT in the US 
to show that those who believed they had an op-
portunity available to few others were more likely to 
agree with a request (i.e. filing taxes) than those who 
thought the opportunity was available to everyone. 
Kastlunger et al. (2011), in an RCT carried out in Italy, 
investigated the effect of rewards on tax compliance 
and found that overall there was no effect. In fact, 
it appears that it provoked an all or nothing type of 
behaviour for taxpayers. However, certain groups of 
taxpayer, such as those who are compliant and sub-
sequently rewarded, are more likely to remain compli-
ant in the future.
One of the major areas of study in energy was 
rewards, discounts and incentives from energy com-
panies or the government. This can also include dif-
ferent pricing schemes, such as peak pricing or time-
of-use pricing initiatives. Many discount or reward 
schemes were overall effective, but most of these re-
sults came with caveats, where only certain types of 
incentives work, while others do not (Country Energy 
of Australia 2005). The main issue is the large upfront 
cost for many people to install serious energy saving 
additions such as a new boiler or insulation. Although 
in the long run this would save people a lot of mon-
ey, it could take families several years to see real-time 
effects, dissuading many. This is in line with psycho-
logical research that shows that humans are not fully 
rational beings and they do not always choose the 
best and most rewarding outcome, preferring mostly 
to play it safe and choose instant benefits over longer 
term ones (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975).
The increased focus and success of rewards 
within the energy field is likely related to its non-com-
pulsory status. As was mentioned in the social norms 
section, the most effective use of social norms was 
in a competitive format, which aligns with the use of 
rewards. However, encouraging competition and of-
fering rewards has less in common with a compulso-
ry approach, where it could be argued that the state 
should not reward compliance, as compliance should 
be expected.
Key findings:
•	 Rewarding compliance has little overall effect 
on tax compliance (Kastlunger et al. 2011).
•	 Many discount or reward schemes are effec-
tive for reducing energy consumption (Country 
Energy of Australia 2005).
Conclusions
This review has covered some of the key literature 
across two policy areas that fall under compulsory 
compliance interventions and non-compulsory co-
operation interventions. It compared various types 
of study to understand what are the most effective 
methods of intervention. The key findings have been 
framed in a broader context than just tax and energy, 
instead making comparisons across compulsory and 
non-compulsory areas, which ensures this review 
has much broader relevance to policy-making.
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In order for policy-makers to make informed deci-
sions about choosing interventions, there does need 
to be a clear evidence base from which to draw. In 
line with our first research question, this review has 
attempted to draw together some of the key areas of 
behavioural intervention research in two distinct ar-
eas. We found that overall, behavioural approaches 
focusing on social norms and provision of profession-
al advice and information are often successful across 
both policy areas. Punishment, when used appro-
priately, can be effective in ensuring tax compliance, 
while rewards have little effect on tax but an overall 
positive effect on reducing energy consumption.
To address our second research question on 
the criteria for success of behavioural interventions, 
we have been able to discuss the important role of 
compulsory versus non-compulsory policy fields to 
behavioural interventions. This distinction may not be 
apparent when using other approaches to interven-
tions, but from a behavioural and decision-making 
perspective, the drive and incentive to act in a cer-
tain way becomes incredibly important. Therefore, we 
have managed to draw out broader conclusions for 
policy-makers from reviewing two contrasting policy 
areas of tax and energy.
The results of this review therefore have impor-
tant implications for policymakers, in helping review 
the effectiveness of their interventions, and in di-
recting intervention design. Across both compulsory 
and non-compulsory areas, the evidence shows so-
cial norms to have a significant effect on behaviour 
change. Therefore, if policymakers wish to change 
behaviour, investing in longer-term development of 
social norms may be the best course. This could 
be especially important for consideration of future 
changes in law. For instance, with climate change 
becoming an increasingly important issue for gov-
ernments and public, changing social norms around 
energy use is currently in the public interest, but 
may well be an area that becomes law in the future 
in order to help governments reach their emissions 
targets. If this were to happen, the development of 
social norms pre-legislature could increase the likeli-
hood of effective compliance.
Notes
1. These include five papers and four energy papers 
suggested by the reviewer. Four of the tax papers 
and one energy paper are themselves reviews or me-
ta-analyses.
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Appendix
Table 1 Literature matrix of Tax Compliance, Fees and Fines studies reviewed
Study
Program/type of 
intervention
Population Study design Findings
Experimental
Wenzel (2005) Feedback about 
compliance
Australia RCT, 64, 2nd 1500; Feedback reduces 
deductions
Lamberton et al (2014) Does offering tax 
choice increase 
compliance
RCT, pilot 125, 1st 
182, 2nd 25
Choice increases 
tax by 15–16%
Coleman (1996) Audit, service, norms 
on compliance
USA RCT, 1,850,000 Audit works, 
performance does 
not, norms work
Coleman (2007) Impact of norms 
(replication)
USA RCT Control 8850, 
treatment 8537;
Replication of norms 
work
Slemrod et al (2001) Probability of audit USA RCT 1724, Audit works
Blumenthal et al (2001) Normative appeals USA, Minnesota Difference-in-
Difference analysis, 
60,000
Appeals do not 
work
Tan and Yim (2014) Uncertainty of audit USA Laboratory 
experiment,192, 64 
per group,
More uncertainty 
works
McGraw and Scholz 
(1991)
Deterrence vs social 
norms
USA RCT; two groups and 
one control, 1142
Deterrence and 
norms do not 
increase compliance
Iyer et al (2010) Enhancing risk and 
penalty awareness
USA RCT, 2x2,1000 
construction firms
Risk and penalty 
work
Hasseldine et al (2007) Norms versus 
sanctions
UK RCT; 2x2, 7300, sole 
proprietors
Norms and 
sanctions both work
Kastlunger et al (2011) Rewards on tax 
compliance; two 
reward conditions
Italy Laboratory 
experiment, 86
No impact
Spicer and Thomas 
(1982)
Test audit probability USA Laboratory 
experiment; three 
groups, 54
Precise information 
on audit works
Hallsworth et al (2014) Norms; six social 
norms messages
UK RCT, 101,471 Local norm works 
best
Torgler (2004) Moral suasion Switzerland 580 No effect
Wenzel (2006) Fairness Australia 2052 Fairness works
Wenzel and Taylor 
(2004)
Itemise expenses Australia 4500 Filling out form 
reduces deduction
Observational
Fiorio and Santoro 
(2011)
Threat of audit Italy 200,000; two groups Threat letter works
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Bergman and Nevarez 
(2006)
Audit Argentina and 
Chile
3000; VAT taxpayers Audit increase 
non- compliance
Simulation
Hashimzade et al (2012) Social networks n/a Reinforcement of 
networks Varies by 
occupation
Garrido and Mittone 
(2011)
Audit Italy Data from 
experiments
Number of audits 
important
Qualitative
HMRC (2009) Assistance UK 100; taxpayers who 
took up assistance 
options
Limited impact of 
assistance
Surveys
Murphy (2008) Attitudes to 
compliance
Australia 652; taxpayers who 
had avoided taxes
Perception of 
enforcement 
matters
Devos (2012) Advice on compliance Australia 174 Professionals 
increase compliance
Reviews
Kirchler (2008) Assessing the 
range of factors for 
compliance
67 studies and 
general papers
Importance of trust, 
norms
OECD (2010) Review of factors 
affecting tax 
compliance
Literature review, 
questionnaire to 
members
Importance of 
deterrence, norms, 
fairness
Pickhardt and Prinz 
(2014)
Assessment of strong 
tools of enforcement
Review of 15 
papers appearing 
in special issue of 
Journal of Economic 
Psychology
Audit can reduce 
compliance
Behavioural Insights 
Team (2012)
Review of evidence General review of the 
policy evidence
Role of norms
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Table 2 Literature matrix of Energy studies reviewed
Study
Program/type of 
intervention
Population
Sample 
group(s) and 
size(s)
Study 
design
Findings
Experimental
Gleerup et al 
(2010)
Effects of SMS + 
e-mail on electricity 
use;
Denmark 1451 households RCT; 3 
treatments
Both email and 
SMS effective
Schultz et al 
(2008)
Social norms USA 2359 RCT; 6 norm 
messages
Norms work
Costa and Kahn 
(2013)
Social norms USA c=49,000 
t=35,000
RCT; home 
electricity 
reports
Liberals 
reduced 
more than 
conservatives
Allcott (2011) Social norms USA 600,000 
households; RDD
RCT Social norm 
work in 
high use 
households; 
injunctive 
norms in low 
use
Midden et al 
(1983)
Compare feedback 
and norms
Holland 91 apartments RCT; 4 
treatment 
groups
Feedback, 
norms and 
financial 
reinforcement 
works
Brandon and 
Lewis (1999)
Compare feedback 
information, norms
UK 120 households RCT;  4 
treatment 
groups focus 
groups
Only feedback 
works
Alahmad et al 
(2012)
Feedback USA 151 households RCT Limited 
evidence that 
feedback works
Katzev and 
Johnson (1984)
Commitment and 
incentives
USA 90 RCT; 5 
treatments
Commitment; 
incentive with 
commitment 
work
Winett et al 
(1982)
Feedback with 
information
USA winter=83, 
summer= 54
RCT; 2x2 
design
Feedback 
works
Matsukawa 
(2004)
Effect of monitoring 
device
Japan 319 RCT; 1 
treatment
Monitoring 
works
Hydro One 
Networks (2006)
Feedback on time of 
use
Canada 400 RCT; meters Feedback 
works
Allcott and 
Rogers (2012)
Feedback on energy 
use
USA 234,000 
households
RCT; reports Long-run 
impact
Geller (1981) Conservation 
workshops
USA 117 individuals RCT; workshop Reduction in 
energy use
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Observational
Petersen et al 
(2007)
Social norms USA 1612 Comparison; 
two dorms 
provided with 
feedback
Reduction in 
energy use
Goldstein et al 
(2007)
Social norms N unknown; four 
groups
Comparison Norms work; 
room norm 
effect
Hayes and Cone 
(1977)
Information feedback, 
payments
USA 480 identical 
houses;
Comparison 
(assumed 
random)
Payment and 
feedback work
Green (2008) Test meters and 
contacts
USA 300 Comparison; in 
home meters 
calls and 
emails
Programme 
works
Country Energy 
of Australia 
(2005)
Tests meters Australia 200 Comparison; 
real time 
monitors in 
homes
Monitoring 
works
McMakin et al 
(2002)
Campaigns USA 2 military bases Before 
and after 
measurement
Energy savings
Reviews
Abrahamse and 
Steg (2013)
Meta-analysis RCTs worldwide 29 studies Meta-analysis Social influence 
works
